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ABSTRACT
In cities throughout the United States, blacks tend to live in significantly poorer and lower-amenity
neighborhoods than whites. An obvious first-order explanation for this is that an individual’’s race
is strongly correlated with socioeconomic status (SES), and poorer households can only afford lower
quality neighborhoods. This paper conjectures that another explanation may be as important. The
limited supply of high-SES black neighborhoods in most U.S. metropolitan areas means that
neighborhood race and neighborhood quality are explicitly bundled together. In the presence of any
form of segregating preferences, this bundling raises the implicit price of neighborhood amenities
for blacks relative to whites, prompting our conjecture  ￿ that racial differences in the consumption
of neighborhood amenities are significantly exacerbated by sorting on the basis of race, given the
small numbers of blacks and especially high-SES blacks in many cities. To provide evidence on this
conjecture, we estimate an equilibrium sorting model with detailed restricted Census microdata and
use it to carry out informative counterfactual simulations. Results from these indicate that racial
sorting explains a substantial portion of the gap between whites and blacks in the consumption of
a wide range of neighborhood amenities  ￿ in fact, as much as underlying socioeconomic differences
across race. We also show that the adverse effects of racial sorting for blacks are fundamentally
related  to  the  small  proportion  of  blacks  in  the  U.S.  metropolitan  population.  These  results
emphasize  the  significant  role  of  racial  sorting  in  the  inter-generational  persistence  of  racial
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1  INTRODUCTION 
In cities throughout the United States, blacks tend to live in significantly poorer and lower-
amenity neighborhoods than whites.  Many researchers posit that such neighborhood differences 
play a central role in the perpetuation of racial inequality (see Wilson (1987) and Massey and 
Denton (1993), for example).
1,2 In trying to understand how these substantial gaps in 
neighborhood quality across race arise, an obvious first-order explanation is that an individual’s 
race is strongly correlated with socioeconomic status (SES),
3 and poorer households can only 
afford lower quality neighborhoods.  This paper conjectures that another explanation may be 
important, due to a combination of racial sorting and the short supply of predominantly black, 
high-amenity neighborhoods in almost all U.S. metropolitan areas.   
The short supply is stark: while over 11,000 Census tracts in U.S. metropolitan areas are at 
least 40 percent college-educated, for example, a mere 44 of these tracts are also at least 60 
percent black.
4  As a consequence of this short supply, neighborhood race and many other 
neighborhood characteristics are explicitly linked in the set of residential options available to 
most households: in order to choose high-amenity neighborhoods, households must typically live 
with a higher fraction of white neighbors, given that the full range of possible neighborhood 
options is not spanned.    
The bundling of neighborhood race and other neighborhood amenities would be of little 
import if households had identical preferences for neighborhood racial composition or if race 
played no role in household location decisions.  But given any form of segregating preferences in 
the population,
5 this bundling drives a wedge between the implicit price that whites versus blacks 
must pay in order to consume higher levels of a given neighborhood amenity.  Imagine, for 
example, that black and white households preferred to live with neighbors of the same race, other 
things equal.  In this situation, while all households would pay the direct cost of residing in high-
                                                      
1 In the words of Massey and Denton (1993), “a significant share of black America is condemned to 
experience a social environment where poverty and joblessness are the norm,… where educational failure 
prevails, and where social and physical deterioration abound.  Through prolonged exposure to such an 
environment, black chances for social and economic success are drastically reduced” (page 2).  
2 The intergenerational persistence of income inequality across race is also an important theme in the work 
of Glenn Loury (see, for example, Loury (1977)), drawing attention to the role of negative externalities in 
the human capital accumulation process for blacks, some of which operate at the neighborhood level. 
3 For example, 15 percent of black adults compared to 33 percent of white adults had attained a 4-year 
college degree in U.S. metropolitan areas in 2000.   
4 Of the 44 tracts, 33 are located in one of four metropolitan areas: Baltimore-Washington, Detroit, Los 
Angeles, and Atlanta.  Only 142 tracts are at least 40 percent black and at least 40 percent college-educated. 
5 Note that the implicit price wedge described here would arise under any of the following forms of 
segregating preferences: (i) if whites and blacks each preferred neighbors of the same race (ii) if whites and 
blacks both preferred black neighbors but blacks were willing to pay for them or (iii) if whites and blacks 
both preferred white neighbors but whites were willing to pay more for them.    2 
 
amenity neighborhoods via higher housing prices, the increased fraction of whites in these 
neighborhoods would be welfare-enhancing for whites and welfare-decreasing for blacks.  In 
turn, as each household responded in a decentralized way to its own implicit price when deciding 
where to live, the resulting consumption of neighborhood amenities by blacks would be lower 
than that of otherwise-identical whites.
6  
This discussion prompts our main conjecture: given the short supply of high-amenity, 
predominantly black neighborhoods in most metropolitan areas, racial sorting – whether driven 
by decentralized preferences or discrimination – is likely to exacerbate the gap between blacks 
and whites in the consumption of many neighborhood amenities.
7,8 Further, the resulting adverse 
effects of racial sorting for blacks may diminish as the proportion of (especially high-SES) blacks 
in the metropolitan population grows larger and high-amenity black neighborhoods form, given 
evidence (see Bayer, Fang, and McMillan (2005)) that the availability of mixed- and high-SES 
black neighborhoods is increasing in the proportion of highly educated blacks in the metropolitan 
population.  
The central task of the current paper is to shed light on our conjecture empirically.  To do so, 
one would ideally like to compare observed racial differences in the consumption of 
neighborhood amenities with those arising in a world in which households chose neighborhoods 
without regard for race.  To investigate the role played by the proportion of highly educated 
blacks, in turn one would ideally like to examine the impact of increasing the proportion of blacks 
in the population on the consumption effects of racial sorting, while holding the strength of 
‘preferences’ for neighborhood race constant.  
The primary analysis presented in this paper is designed to implement these ideal thought 
experiments in an intuitive way.  Specifically, using restricted-access Census data that precisely 
match nearly a quarter of a million households to their neighborhoods in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, we estimate a flexible equilibrium model of residential sorting and use it to conduct 
counterfactual simulations that correspond directly to these thought experiments.
9  At its heart, 
                                                      
6 As we discuss in more detail below, discriminatory practices that increase the implicit price that blacks 
versus whites pay for housing in predominantly white neighborhoods clearly have the same implications 
regarding the consumption of neighborhood amenities by blacks versus whites.  The goal of this paper is 
the measure the total impact of racial sorting not to distinguish between these alternative explanations. 
7 A gap between blacks and whites in the consumption of neighborhood amenities would arise even in the 
absence of racial sorting because of the substantial underlying differences between blacks and whites in 
socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., income, education) that contribute to residential sorting.   
8 While not generally explicitly linked to the size of the black population or the availability of high-SES 
black neighborhoods, the literature examining the spatial mismatch hypothesis, first proposed by Kain 
(1968), has spawned innumerable studies that suggest that residential segregation can exacerbate existing 
inequalities in employment access and outcomes.  See Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (2000) for a recent survey. 
9 This model is presented fully in Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2005).   3 
 
our primary estimation approach relies on the standard economic notion of revealed preference: 
by examining how location decisions vary on average with household characteristics (such as 
income, education and race) given the set of neighborhoods available in the market, we infer how 
the demand for housing and neighborhood attributes varies with these household characteristics. 
In estimating the model, we are also careful to address an important endogeneity problem that 
arises due to the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics with unobserved 
aspects of housing and neighborhood quality (a correlation that is induced by residential sorting), 
implementing a boundary fixed effects strategy closely related to that of Black (1999). The 
resulting preference estimates are reasonable in magnitude across a wide set of housing and 
neighborhood attributes, providing evidence of strong interactions in the utility function between 
individual and neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics, consistent with stratification 
along both racial and socioeconomic dimensions in equilibrium. 
Using the estimated household preferences along with our equilibrium model, we then carry 
out two complementary simulations that provide evidence on our conjecture.  In the first, we 
compare the actual state of the world to one in which race is eliminated as a factor in each 
household’s residential location decision.
10,11 Eliminating racial sorting – whether driven by 
preferences or discrimination – leads to a substantial decrease in racial segregation across all 
socioeconomic levels in the new equilibrium, although some segregation persists due to the 
sizeable average differences remaining between blacks and whites in education, income, and 
wealth. At the same time, average black-white differences in the consumption of many 
neighborhood amenities are also substantially reduced. Specifically, the results imply that 
eliminating neighborhood race from the location decision cuts the black-white gap in 
neighborhood school quality and crime by more than half and the gap in average neighborhood 
income and education by nearly this amount. This indicates that racial sorting is as important as 
the underlying socioeconomic differences between whites and blacks in driving differences in the 
consumption of neighborhood amenities.  
                                                      
10 In light of the potential for racial discrimination in the housing market, it is important to point out that the 
‘preference’ parameters estimated in our analysis combine the impact of preferences and discrimination.  
That is, discriminatory practices that increase the implicit price that blacks versus whites pay for housing in 
predominantly white neighborhoods will generally result in the estimation of stronger ‘preferences’ among 
blacks for predominantly black neighborhoods.  In our first simulation, setting the ‘preference’ parameters 
in the model associated with neighborhood race to zero corresponds to eliminating both decentralized racial 
preferences and any centralized discriminatory practices that exist in the current state of the world. 
11 Mechanically, this involves calculating a new housing market equilibrium that allows households to re-
sort and housing prices to adjust, having first set all of the utility function parameters associated with 
neighborhood racial composition equal to zero.   4 
 
In the second simulation, we equalize (counterfactually) the proportions of blacks and whites 
in the metropolitan area, thereby relieving the existing bundling constraint while leaving all 
preference parameters at their estimated values.  Though this simulation also leaves the 
socioeconomic distribution for both whites and blacks unchanged, the new equilibrium is 
characterized by a sharp increase in the availability of highly-amenity, predominantly-black 
neighborhoods. As a result, the observed white-black gaps in the consumption of neighborhood 
amenities decline by nearly the same amount as in our first simulation: the adverse effects of 
racial sorting for blacks in the Bay Area would be virtually eliminated were blacks to constitute a 
larger proportion of the metropolitan area’s population.  This result makes clear that the small 
proportion of black households found in the typical U.S. metropolitan area is central to racial 
sorting having adverse effects on the consumption of neighborhood amenities by blacks relative 
to whites. 
That the effect of racial sorting declines with the proportion of (highly educated) blacks in the 
population gives rise to an implication that is testable across metropolitan markets.  In particular, 
it implies that the adverse effects of segregation on black outcomes (relative to whites) should 
decline as the proportion of highly educated blacks increase. To provide complementary evidence 
on this aspect of our main hypothesis, we augment the primary regressions reported in Cutler and 
Glaeser (1997, henceforth ‘CG’) in order to examine how the effect of segregation varies with the 
proportion of highly educated blacks in the metropolitan population. This analysis demonstrates 
that the substantial negative effects of segregation for blacks relative to whites shown in CG 
decline to zero as the fraction of college-educated blacks in metropolitan population reaches 3 to 
6 percent (the average fraction in U.S. metro areas in 2000 was 1.7 percent), again implying that 
the adverse effects of racial sorting are strongly linked to the small number of highly educated 
blacks in the population. 
These empirical results draw attention to an important consequence of racial sorting – the 
distortion affecting the neighborhood quality choice
12 – and they provide clear evidence of the 
sheer size of this distortion.  The substantial reductions in neighborhood quality for blacks that we 
find are likely to have a significant impact on the inter-generational persistence of racial 
differences in education, income, and wealth.  Further, our analysis provides a new explanation as 
to why the distortion to neighborhood quality choice arises in the first place, due to a combination 
of a ‘small numbers’ problem and racial sorting.     
                                                      
12 See Massey and Denton (1993) for a discussion in the sociology literature of the losses experienced by 
both middle-class and poor blacks as a result of “the limitation of black residential options through 
segregation” (page 9).   5 
 
Our analysis informs a much larger body of research that examines the impact of segregation 
on individual outcomes. Most importantly, it implies that segregation measured at either the 
neighborhood or metropolitan level does not provide a sufficient statistic for estimating the 
impact of racial sorting. In particular, because racial sorting is directly responsible for a sizeable 
portion of the difference in neighborhood amenity consumption by blacks versus whites, analyses 
of the impact of neighborhood measures of segregation on individual outcomes that condition on 
these other neighborhood characteristics may inadvertently attribute too little of the black-white 
differences in outcomes to racial sorting.
13 Moreover, our second simulation makes clear that the 
adverse effect of racial sorting for blacks is not fully captured by an estimate of the impact of 
metropolitan segregation on individual outcomes. In particular, it shows plainly that an increase 
in the proportion of blacks in the population of a metropolitan area can reduce the adverse effects 
of racial sorting for blacks while simultaneously increasing the level of segregation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents descriptive evidence from all 
metropolitan areas in the United States on neighborhood availability and segregation using 2000 
Census data, helping motivate our conjecture. Section 3 outlines the key feature of our detailed 
San Francisco Bay Area dataset, and Section 4 provides descriptive evidence related to 
neighborhood supply and sorting just using Bay Area data. Sections 5, 6 and 7 describe the main 
analytical tool used in this paper - an equilibrium model of residential sorting - describing the 
model, its estimation, and the estimated parameters in turn. Section 8 then uses the estimated 
model to conduct two counterfactual simulations that shed light on our conjecture. Section 9 
provides complementary evidence based on augmented Cutler-Glaeser regressions and Section 10 
concludes. 
 
2  PATTERNS OF RACIAL SORTING IN U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS 
  Our primary analysis will be based on detailed microdata drawn from the San Francisco 
Bay Area. In this section, we provide motivation for that analysis by characterizing the supply of 
neighborhoods in all U.S. cities. The primary goal of this initial analysis is to demonstrate that the 
fundamental conditions motivating our main conjecture exist in most U.S. metropolitan areas. In 
particular, we show that (i) neighborhoods combining high-fractions of both college-educated and 
black individuals are in short supply in almost every metropolitan area in the United States and 
(ii) that faced with the resulting trade-off between black versus other college-educated neighbors, 
college-educated blacks choose a very diverse set of neighborhoods in each metropolitan area. 
                                                      
13 See, for example, Kain (1968), Ihlanfeldt (1992), Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990), O’Regan and Quigley 
(1998), Ross (1998), Weinberg (2000, 2004), and Ross and Zenou (2004), among many others.   6 
 
This analysis also serves to highlight the fact that the racial composition and set of available 
neighborhoods in the San Francisco Bay Area are in fact comparable to the average patterns for 
U.S. metropolitan areas as a whole.  
  Our approach is straightforward. Using publicly available Census Tract Summary Files (SF3) 
from the 2000 Census, we characterize the distribution of race and neighborhood quality for all 
neighborhoods in U.S. metropolitan areas (MSAs).
14 We also plot the distribution of available 
neighborhoods in individual MSAs, drawing attention to important patterns in terms of 
neighborhood availability.  
  In this portion of the analysis, a ‘neighborhood’ corresponds to a Census tract, which 
typically contains 3,000 to 5,000 individuals and we summarize neighborhood quality in a single 
dimension - the fraction of residents who are college-educated. (Using far richer data for the San 
Francisco Bay Area, we consider a much wide set of neighborhood attributes below.) In terms of 
racial composition, we focus on non-Hispanic black and non-Hispanic white individuals 25 years 
and older residing in U.S. metropolitan areas. Non-Hispanic blacks and whites respectively 
constitute 11.1 and 69.5 percent of the U.S. population 25 years and older residing in 
metropolitan areas. Among blacks, 15.4 percent have a four-year college degree, while the 
comparable number for whites is 32.5 percent.  
  We begin by showing that, while neighborhoods combining high fractions of both college-
educated and white individuals are abundant in all metropolitan areas, neighborhoods that 
combine high fractions of both college-educated and black individuals are in extremely short 
supply. To that end, Table 1 documents the number of tracts in the U.S. by the percentage of 
individuals with a college degree and the percentage of individuals who are black or white 
respectively. Panel A describes the number of tracts in which more than 0, 20, 40 and 60 percent 
of individuals 25 years and older are at least college-educated, respectively. Panel B then reports 
the number of tracts in each of the categories listed in the column headings that contain a 
minimum fraction of blacks equal to 20, 40, 60, and 80 percent, respectively. As the 
corresponding numbers show, a much smaller fraction of the tracts with a high fraction black also 
have a high fraction of individuals with a college degree. For example, while 22.6 percent (row 1, 
column 3) of all tracts are at least 40 percent college-educated, only 2.5 percent (row 3, column 3) 
of tracts that are at least 40 percent black are at least 40 percent college-educated, and only 1.1 
percent (row 4, column 3) of tracts that are at least 60 percent black are at least 40 percent 
college-educated. Panel C of Table 1 presents analogous numbers for whites. They show a   7 
 
markedly different pattern of neighborhood choices for whites, with a far greater fraction of 
neighborhoods with at least 40, 60, and 80 percent whites meeting the education criteria listed in 
the column headings. 
In addition to being in short supply overall, neighborhoods combining high fractions of both 
college-educated and black individuals are concentrated in only a handful of metropolitan areas, 
most notably Baltimore-Washington DC, indicating that the supply of such neighborhoods in 
most metropolitan areas is even more limited.
15 The absence of these neighborhoods means that 
neighborhood race and many other neighborhood characteristics are explicitly linked in the set of 
residential options available to most households: in order to choose neighborhoods with more 
college-educated neighbors, households must typically live with a greater fraction of whites. It is 
the explicit bundling of neighborhood race and other neighborhood amenities in the absence of 
high-amenity black neighborhoods that motivates our main hypothesis.    
To illustrate this potential trade-off, Figure 1 shows scatterplots of available neighborhoods in 
three metropolitan areas: Boston, Dallas, San Francisco and St. Louis.  In the scatterplots, a circle 
represents a Census tract and its coordinates represent the fraction of college-educated individuals 
(vertical axis) and the fraction of blacks (horizontal axis) in the tract. The diameter of the circle is 
proportional to the number of college educated blacks in the tract; thus the largest circles 
correspond to the tracts where highly educated blacks are most likely to live. 
The scatterplots demonstrate the short supply of neighborhoods that combine high fractions 
of both highly educated and black individuals, neighborhoods that would have appeared in the 
north-east corner of each plot, had they existed. Figure 1 also demonstrates that, facing this 
constrained choice set, college-educated blacks choose to live in a diverse set of neighborhoods: 
while a sizeable fraction of college-educated blacks in each of these MSAs choose neighborhoods 
with few black and many college-educated neighbors (neighborhoods in the north-western corner 
of the plots), another sizeable fraction choose neighborhoods with many black and few college-
educated neighbors (neighborhoods in the south-eastern corner of the plots).  
To show that the patterns shown in Figure 1 are representative of those for U.S. metropolitan 
areas as a whole, Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of neighborhoods in which 
                                                                                                                                                              
14 In this section, we define metropolitan areas as either (i) free-standing Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs) or (ii) Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) consisting of two or more 
economically and socially linked metropolitan areas - Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs).   
15 Of the 44 tracts that are at least 60 percent black and 40 percent college-educated, for example 14 are in 
Baltimore-Washington DC, 8 in Detroit, 6 in Los Angeles, and 5 in Atlanta.  Of the 142 tracts (see row 3, 
column 3 of Table 2) that are at least 40 percent black and 40 percent college-educated, almost two-thirds 
are in the MSAs listed above along with Chicago and New York.  See Bayer, Fang, and McMillan (2005) 
for more details.     8 
 
college-educated blacks reside in all U.S. MSAs.  We first rank college-educated blacks in each 
MSA by the fraction of blacks in their Census tract and assign individuals to their corresponding 
quintile of this distribution. This corresponds to drawing four vertical lines in the scatterplot for 
each metropolitan area such that an equal number of college-educated blacks fall into each of the 
resulting five regions. Panel A of Table 2 then summarizes the neighborhood characteristics 
corresponding to these quintiles, averaged over all U.S. metropolitan areas. 
  The table shows a clear trade-off for college-educated blacks between the fraction of their 
neighbors who are black and the fraction who are highly educated: the average fraction of highly 
educated neighbors falls from 38.0 percent for those college-educated blacks living with the 
smallest fraction of black neighbors to 13.8 percent for those living with the largest fraction. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports analogous numbers for college-educated whites. Comparison of Panels 
A and B reveals that the 40 percent of college-educated blacks in each metropolitan area who live 
in the tracts with the smallest fraction of other blacks have roughly the same fraction of college-
educated neighbors as college-educated whites do on average; however, college-educated blacks 
living with the greatest fraction of other blacks have only about one-third of the fraction of highly 
educated neighbors.  
That such a high fraction of college-educated blacks in U.S. metropolitan areas in Table 2 
choose segregated neighborhoods with relatively low average education attainment is consistent 
with two aspects our main conjecture. First, it suggests that, whether due to preferences or 
discrimination, race remains an important factor in the location decisions of a large number of 
college-educated blacks. This helps to cast doubt on an obvious potential explanation for the 
absence of neighborhoods combining high fractions of both college-educated and black 
individuals – namely, that college-educated blacks simply chose college-educated neighborhoods 
without regard for the racial composition. Second, the especially low levels of average 
neighborhood educational attainment for those college-educated blacks living in the most 
segregated neighborhoods suggests that racial sorting may indeed have a substantial impact on 
the consumption of neighborhood amenities by blacks. It is important to recognize, however, that 
the evidence presented in Table 2 is far from conclusive in this regard. Other explanations for this 
pattern related to heterogeneity in other important individual attributes (e.g., income and wealth) 
or in neighborhood amenities other than average educational attainment might explain these 
observed patterns. It is precisely these alternative potential explanation that our primary analysis, 
which conditions on a wide set of individual and neighborhood attributes, is designed to address. 
Finally, we motivate the idea that the short supply of high-amenity black neighborhoods may 
be systematically relaxed as the number of college-educated blacks in a metropolitan areas   9 
 
increases with a combination of regression analysis and scatterplots for a different set of U.S. 
cities.
16,17 In particular, Figure 2 depicts analogous scatterplots to those presented in Figure 1 for 
Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit and Washington DC – MSAs that contain a much more sizeable number 
of college-educated blacks than those MSAs shown in Figure 1. As Figure 2 clearly shows, the 
supply of neighborhoods combining relatively high fractions of both black and highly educated 
individuals is substantially greater in these MSAs.  As a result, we would expect the adverse 
effects of racial sorting for the consumption of neighborhood amenities by blacks versus whites to 
be less severe in these MSAs. We provide evidence on this aspect of our main conjecture in the 
second simulation and with additional across-metropolitan analysis, which reveal that the adverse 
effects of racial sorting for black neighborhood amenity consumption are indeed directly related 
to the fact that blacks (college-educated blacks in particular) represent such a small fraction of the 
population of the San Francisco Bay Area and, more generally, the U.S. metropolitan population.  
 
3  DATA FOR PRIMARY ANALYSIS 
Given this broad characterization of racial sorting in MSAs throughout the U.S., we now turn 
to the much more detailed dataset for our primary analysis. The particular dataset that we 
construct is based primarily on restricted Census microdata for the San Francisco Bay Area for 
1990. These restricted Census data provide the same detailed individual, household, and housing 
variables found in the public-use version of the Census, but also include information on the 
location of individual residences and workplaces at a very disaggregate level. In particular, while 
public-use data specify the PUMA (a Census region with at least 100,000 individuals) in which a 
household lives, the restricted data specify the Census block (a Census region with an average of 
100 individuals), thereby identifying an individual’s neighborhood far more precisely than has 
been previously possible with such a large data set. These data allow us to estimate a model of 
residential sorting on the part of individual households, while controlling carefully for a wide set 
                                                      
16 Indeed, regressions of the number or fraction of tracts in an MSA that are at least 40 percent college-
educated and 40 percent black on metropolitan socioeconomic characteristics reveal a strong positive 
relationship with the fraction of college-educated blacks in the MSA. The number of such tracts is also, not 
surprisingly, increasing in the population of the MSA and a similar pattern holds for any combination of 
education and race criterion that count the number of tracts in the upper-right portion of the scatterplots. 
17 We also examined a series of quantile regressions designed to fit the 90th percentile of the relationship 
between neighborhood education and race shown in the scatterplots for college-educated blacks -- that is, to 
approximate the implicit neighborhood availability constraint defined by the absence of neighborhoods in 
the upper-right portion of these scatterplots. These regressions demonstrate that the neighborhood 
availability constraint shifts significantly outward as the fraction of college-educated blacks in the MSA 
population is increased. This result holds no matter whether the fraction black or fraction of college-
educated households in the MSA is held constant. 
   10 
 
of household characteristics and making use of reasonable variation in the data to identify the 
impact of a wide variety of factors (including neighborhood racial composition) on each 
individual’s location decision.  
In assembling our Bay Area dataset, we use data from six contiguous counties: Alameda, 
Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, San Francisco, and Santa Clara. The resulting study area is 
reasonably self-contained and sizeable along a number of dimensions, including over 1,100 
Census tracts, and almost 39,500 Census blocks, the smallest unit of aggregation in the data. Our 
final sample consists of just over 242,000 households. We also note that, among the largest 
metropolitan areas in the US, the fraction of black and white households in the San Francisco Bay 
Area (68.6 percent white, 7.6 percent black) most closely matches that of the country as a whole 
(69.5 percent white, 11.1 percent black).  
The Census provides a wealth of data on the individuals in the sample – race, age, 
educational attainment, income from various sources, household size and structure, occupation, 
and employment location.
18 In addition, it provides a variety of housing characteristics: whether 
the unit is owned or rented, the corresponding rent or owner-reported value,
19 number of rooms, 
number of bedrooms, type of structure, and the age of the building. We use these housing 
characteristics directly and in constructing neighborhood characteristics, characterizing stock of 
housing in the neighborhood surrounding each house, as well as neighborhood racial, education 
and income distributions based on the households within the same Census block group, a Census 
region containing approximately 500 housing units. We merge additional data describing local 
conditions with each house record, constructing variables related to crime rates, land use, local 
schools, topography, and urban density.
20 The list of the principal housing and neighborhood 
variables used in the analysis, along with means and standard deviations, is given in the first two 
columns of Table 3. 
                                                      
18 Throughout our analysis, we treat the household as the decision-making agent and characterize each 
household’s race as the race of the ‘householder’, assigning households to one of four mutually exclusive 
categories of race/ethnicity: Hispanic, non-Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic black, and non-Hispanic white.  
To maintain a streamlined exposition of results, we focus on black and white households, although it is 
important to point out that our primary analysis also controls separately for Asian and Hispanic households.   
19 As described in the Data Appendix, we construct a single price vector for all houses, whether rented or 
owned.  Because the implied relationship between house values and current rents depends on expectations 
about the growth rate of future rents in the market, we estimate a series of hedonic price regressions for 
each of over 40 sub-regions of the Bay Area housing market.  These regressions return an estimate of the 
ratio of house values to rents for each of these sub-regions. 
20 For each of these measures, a detailed description of the process by which the original data were assigned 
to each house is provided in a Data Appendix.   11 
 
4  RACIAL SORTING AND NEIGHBORHOOD AMENITIES IN THE BAY AREA 
Before turning to our model of residential sorting, we first describe the patterns of racial 
sorting and consumption of neighborhood amenities in the San Francisco Bay Area. The main 
goal of this section is to illustrate that the pattern demonstrated for average neighborhood 
education for all U.S. metropolitan areas extends to a wider set of neighborhood amenities. This 
analysis also illustrates how housing prices vary with neighborhood amenities and racial 
composition. 
 
Segregation Patterns. We begin by describing the pattern of racial segregation in the Bay Area. 
We do so by examining the average compositions of the neighborhoods (Census block groups in 
this case) in which households in a particular category of race and income reside.
21 These 
measures are reported in Panel A of Table 4. The measures in the first row show neighborhood 
compositions averaged over all of the households in the Bay Area. The remaining rows report 
neighborhood compositions averaged over the set of households described in the row heading. 
The second row, for example, indicates that black households live in neighborhoods in which an 
average of 20.9 percent of the households are both black and in the lowest income quartile, 9.0 
percent are black and in the second income quartile, etc. Average neighborhood compositions are 
reported for blacks and whites as a whole and for blacks and whites in the lowest and highest 
income quartile, respectively.  
Panel B of Table 4 re-summarizes these average neighborhood composition measures 
reported in Panel A in a way that is more meaningful for discussing segregation, reporting the 
average neighborhood composition for a particular type of household relative to the average for 
the Bay Area as a whole. For example, the first entry of Panel B is calculated as the average 
exposure of black households to blacks in the lowest income quartile (20.9 percent), divided by 
the average exposure of all households in the Bay Area to blacks in the lowest income quartile 
(3.4 percent). This implies that a black household in the Bay Area is exposed on average to 6.1 
times the fraction of blacks in the lowest income quartile that the average household in the Bay 
Area is exposed to. 
  Panel B reveals a clear pattern of racial segregation for Bay Area blacks that cuts across all 
income categories. While blacks in the lowest income quartile are exposed to 6.2 times the 
fraction of blacks relative to the average household in the metropolitan area, the comparable 
figure for blacks in the highest income quartile is 3.2, which indicates a substantial amount of 
                                                      
21 We use income throughout the remainder of the paper as a proxy for socioeconomic status in describing 
the results or our analysis.  Results based on education or income conditional on education are completely 
analogous.   12 
 
segregation even for high-income blacks. Moreover, while high-income blacks are especially 
highly exposed to blacks in the highest income quartile (4.4 times the Bay Area average), their 
exposure to blacks in the lowest income quartile also remains high at 2.9 times the Bay Area 
average. Thus race continues to play a large role in the residential choice process even for high-
income blacks. 
  
Racial Sorting and the Consumption of Housing and Neighborhood Amenities. To explore 
this possibility directly, Table 5 describes the distribution of neighborhoods in which blacks and 
whites in the highest quartile of the income distribution reside, respectively.
22 In each case, as in 
Table 2, neighborhoods are first ranked by the fraction of a household’s neighbors that are of the 
same race, and quintiles of the distribution are then reported.  
Panel A shows the distribution of neighborhoods in which blacks in the highest income 
quartile reside. We order these households into five quintiles based on percentage black in the 
neighborhood. Thus the first column provides average housing and neighborhood characteristics 
for the 20 percent of high-income blacks who live in neighborhoods with the lowest fraction of 
black households, neighborhoods in which less than 4 percent of the population is black.  As one 
reads across the columns, the neighborhoods have a higher fraction of black households by 
construction; the final column indicates that fully 20 percent of blacks in the highest income 
quartile reside in neighborhoods in which over 54 percent of the population is black.  
As in Table 2, what emerges from Panel A of Table 5 is a clear picture of the wide range of 
neighborhoods in which high-income blacks reside. Comparing the neighborhoods at either end 
of the spectrum, the levels of school quality, public safety, average neighborhood income, and 
fraction college-educated are each 1.5 to 2 standard deviations greater in the neighborhoods with 
the least versus the greatest fraction of black households. Panel B of Table 5 shows the same 
distribution for whites in the highest income quartile, first ranking neighborhoods by percent 
white and again reporting the quintiles of this distribution. For whites, increases in the fraction of 
white neighbors are accompanied by increases rather than decreases in the consumption of 
housing and neighborhood amenities. Thus, while increased consumption of neighborhood 
amenities such as school quality, public safety, and neighborhood education and income comes at 
the expense of increased housing prices for households of each race, these increases are 
accompanied by sharp decreases in the fraction of households of the same race for blacks and 
increases in the fraction of households of the same race for whites.  
                                                      
22 An analogous table for blacks and whites in the lowest income quartile is included as Appendix Table 1.  
This table generally shows a similar, although muted, pattern as Table 5.    13 
 
While highly suggestive, consumption patterns like those presented in Table 5 do not provide 
conclusive evidence concerning the impact of that racial sorting on the consumption of 
neighborhood amenities. First, the wide variation in neighborhood amenity consumption among 
high-income blacks might reflect heterogeneity in other important individual attributes (e.g., 
income and wealth) or in neighborhood amenities other than those shown in the table. Second, as 
Panel A reveals, those high-income blacks that live in the lowest amenity neighborhoods spend 
substantially less on housing.  Thus, another potential explanation for the lower average 
consumption of neighborhood amenities by blacks relative to whites is that blacks have a lower 
average willingness-to-pay for these amenities relative to whites.  
The primary empirical analysis that we now present isolates the impact of racial sorting from 
these alternative explanations by allowing each of these channels to contribute to observed 
residential location decisions.  Specifically, by conditioning on a wide set of individual and 
neighborhood attributes, this analysis explicitly conditions out any of the variation in 
neighborhood amenity consumption that can be explained by heterogeneity in these attributes.  
Second, by allowing willingness-to-pay for each housing and neighborhood amenity to vary 
completely flexibly by race, our analysis explicitly allows for the possibility that racial 
differences in demand for amenities might explain the observed pattern of neighborhood amenity 
consumption. Our subsequent empirical analysis does imply that each of these alternative 
channels do play a role in explaining consumption patterns.  Even after controlling for these 
alternatives in a very flexible way, however, our analysis leads to the clear conclusion that sorting 
on the basis of neighborhood racial composition – whether due to preferences or discrimination – 
drives a substantial fraction of observed racial differences in neighborhood amenity consumption. 
 
5  A MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SORTING 
To measure the impact of racial sorting on the consumption of neighborhood amenities, we 
now turn to a model of the residential location decision of households in the Bay Area. In 
developing such a model, our goal is to provide the simplest analytical tool that can account for 
(i) heterogeneity in both household attributes and the attributes of houses/neighborhoods and (ii) 
the endogenous determination of housing prices and neighborhood demographic compositions.    
To this end, we adopt the equilibrium model of an urban housing market developed in Bayer, 
McMillan, and Rueben (2004b).  This equilibrium model consists of two key elements: the 
household residential location decision problem and a market-clearing condition. While 
maintaining a simple structure, the model allows households to have heterogeneous preferences 
defined over housing and neighborhood attributes in a very flexible way; it also allows for   14 
 
housing prices and neighborhood demographic compositions to be determined in equilibrium. In 
estimating the model, we are careful to account for the correlation that naturally arises between 
unobserved housing and neighborhood attributes and both housing prices and neighborhood 
composition. Having estimated the model, we then use it to conduct two equilibrium 
counterfactual simulations that provide direct evidence on our main conjecture.
23   
 
The Residential Location Decision. We model the residential location decision of each 
household as a discrete choice of a single residence from a set of houses available in the market. 
The utility function specification is based on the random utility model developed in McFadden 
(1973, 1978) and the specification of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), which includes choice-
specific unobservable characteristics.
24 Let Xh represent the observable characteristics of housing 
choice h including characteristics of the house itself (e.g., size, age, and type), its tenure status 
(rented vs. owned), and the characteristics of its neighborhood (e.g., school, crime, and 
topography). We use Z  to represent the average sociodemographic characteristics of the 
corresponding neighborhood, writing it separately from the other housing and neighborhood 
attributes to make explicit the fact that these characteristics are determined in equilibrium.
25 Let 
ph denote the price of housing choice h and let dh
i denote the distance from residence h to the 
primary work location of household i. Each household chooses its residence h to maximize its 





















The error structure of household indirect utility is divided into a correlated component associated 
with each house valued the same by all households, ξh, and an individual-specific term, ε
i
h. A 
                                                      
23 A long line of theoretical studies, including important papers by Epple, Filimon and Romer (EFR) (1984, 
1993), Benabou (1993, 1996), Anas and Kim (1995), Anas (2002), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 1998), 
and Nechyba (1999, 2000) have developed and used models of sorting to analyze the way that 
interdependent individual decisions in the housing market aggregate up to determine the equilibrium 
structure of a metropolitan area.  In recent years, a new line of empirical research has sought to take these 
models to the data.  Epple and Sieg (1999) develop an estimator for the equilibrium sorting model of EFR, 
providing the first unified treatment of theory and empirics in the literature.  In the same vein, Sieg et al. 
(2004) use this approach to explore the general equilibrium impacts of air quality improvements in the Los 
Angeles Basin.   
24 Discrete choice applications in the urban economics literature include Anas (1982), Quigley (1985), 
Gabriel and Rosenthal (1989), Nechyba and Strauss (1998), and Bajari and Kahn (2001).  Only the latter 
paper includes choice-specific unobservables.  Brock and Durlauf (2001) study a general class of discrete 
choice models with social interactions that do not include choice-specific unobservables. 
25 This component of the utility function allows for endogenous sorting on the basis of race, as in Schelling 
(1969, 1971), as well as on the basis of other characteristics such as income and education.     15 
 
useful interpretation of ξh is that it captures unobserved housing quality, including any 
unobserved quality associated with the surrounding neighborhood.
26  
Each household’s valuation of choice characteristics is allowed to vary with its own 
characteristics,  Z
i, including education, income, race, employment status, and household 
composition. Specifically, each parameter associated with housing and neighborhood 
characteristics and price, α
i
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with equation (2) describing the parameters of household i’s preference for choice characteristic j.  
 
Characterizing the Housing Market. As with all models in this literature, the existence of a 
sorting equilibrium is much easier to establish if the individual residential location decision 
problem is smoothed in some way. To this end, we assume that the housing market can be fully 
characterized by a set of housing types that is a subset of the full set of available houses, letting 
the supply of housing of type h be given by Sh.
27     
Given the household’s problem described in equations (1)-(2), household i chooses housing 
type h if the utility that it receives from this choice exceeds the utility that it receives from all 
other possible house choices - that is, when  
 
























h includes all of the non-idiosyncratic components of the utility function V
i
h. As the 
inequalities in (3) imply, the probability that a household chooses any particular choice depends 
in general on the characteristics of the full set of possible house types. Thus the probability P
i
h 
that household i chooses housing type h can be written as a function of the full vectors of 
house/neighborhood characteristics (both observed and unobserved) and prices {X, p, ξ}: 
 




h Z f P =  
                                                      
26 We employ an indirect utility function that is linear in housing prices.  Alternative specifications of the 
indirect utility function could certainly be estimated, as the linear form is not essential to the model. 
27 We also assume that each household observed in the sample represents a continuum of households with 
the same observable characteristics, with the distribution of idiosyncratic tastes ε
i
h mapping into a set of 
choice probabilities that characterize the distribution of housing choices that would result for the continuum 
of households with a given set of observed characteristics.  For expositional ease and without loss of 
generality, we assume that the measure of this continuum is one.   16 
 
 
as well as the household’s own characteristics Z
i. 
Aggregating the probabilities in equation (4) over all observed households yields the 
predicted demand for each housing type h, Dh: 
 
(5)  ∑ =
i
i
h h P D .
 
 
In order for the housing market to clear, the demand for houses of type h must equal the supply of 
such houses and so: 
 
(6)  h S P h S D h
i
i
h h h ∀ = ⇒ ∀ = ∑ , .  
 
Given the decentralized nature of the housing market, prices are assumed to adjust in order to 
clear the market.  The implications of the market clearing condition defined in equation (6) for 
prices are very standard, with excess demand for a housing type causing price to be bid up and 
excess supply leading prices to fall. Given the indirect utility function defined in (1) and a fixed 
set of housing and neighborhood attributes, Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004b) show that a 
unique set of prices (up to scale) clears the market.  
Given that some neighborhood attributes are endogenously determined by the sorting process 
itself, we define a sorting equilibrium to be a set of residential location decisions and a vector of 
housing prices such that the housing market clears and each household makes its optimal location 
decision given the location decisions of all other households. In equilibrium, the vector of 
neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics along with the corresponding vector of market 
clearing prices must give rise to choice probabilities that aggregate back up to the same vector of 
neighborhood sociodemographics.
28   
Whether this model gives rise to multiple equilibria depends on the distributions of 
preferences and available housing choices, as well as the utility parameters. In general, it is 
impossible to establish that the equilibrium is unique a priori. Fortunately, estimation of the 
model does not require the computation of an equilibrium nor uniqueness more generally, as we 
describe in the next section.  
                                                      
28 Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004b) establish the existence of a sorting equilibrium as long as (i) the 
indirect utility function shown in equation (1) is decreasing in housing prices for all households; (ii) 
indirect utility is a continuous function of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics; and (iii) ε is 
drawn from a continuous density function.   17 
 
6 ESTIMATION 
Estimation of the model follows a two-step procedure related to that developed in Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). A rigorous presentation of the estimation procedure is included in a 
technical appendix, including a discussion of methods for simplifying the computation and a 
description of the asymptotic properties of the estimator. In this section, we outline the estimation 
procedure, focusing on the identification of the model.  
It is helpful to first introduce some notation. In particular, we rewrite the indirect utility 
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In equation (8), δh captures the portion of utility provided by housing type h that is common to all 
households, and in (9), k indexes household characteristics. When the household characteristics 
included in the model are constructed to have mean zero, δh is the mean indirect utility provided 
by housing choice h. The unobservable component of δh, ξh, captures the portion of unobserved 
preferences for housing choice h that is correlated across households, while εh
i represents 
unobserved preferences over and above this shared component.  
  The first step of the estimation procedure is equivalent to a Maximum Likelihood estimator 
applied to the individual location decisions taking prices and neighborhood sociodemographic 
compositions as given,
29 returning estimates of the heterogeneous parameters in λ and mean 
indirect utilities, δh. This estimator is based simply on maximizing the probability that the model 
correctly matches each household observed in the sample with its chosen house type. In 
particular, for any combination of the heterogeneous parameters in λ and mean indirect utilities, 
                                                      
29 Formally, the validity of this first stage procedure requires the assumption that the observed location 
decisions are individually optimal, given the collective choices made by other households and the vector of 
market-clearing prices and that households are sufficiently small such that they do not interact strategically 
with respect to particular draws on ε.  This ensures that no household’s particular idiosyncratic preferences 
affect the equilibrium and the vector of idiosyncratic preferences ε is uncorrelated with the prices and 
neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics that arise in any equilibrium.  For more discussion, see the 
Technical Appendix.   18 
 
δh, the model predicts the probability that each household i chooses house type h. We assume that 
εh














λ δ  
 
Maximizing the probability that each household makes its correct housing choice gives rise to the 
following log-likelihood function:  
 









h is an indicator variable that equals 1 if household i chooses house type h in the data and 
0 otherwise. The first step of the estimation procedure consists of searching over the parameters 
in λ and the vector of mean indirect utilities to maximize l .  
 
The Endogeneity of Neighborhood Sociodemographic Composition. Having estimated the 
vector of mean indirect utilities in the first stage of the estimation, the second stage of the 
estimation involves decomposing δ into observable and unobservable components according to 
the regression equation (8).
30 In estimating equation (8), important endogeneity problems need to 
be confronted. To the extent that house prices partly capture house and neighborhood quality 
unobserved to the econometrician, so the price variable will be endogenous. Estimation via least 
squares will thus lead to price coefficients being biased towards zero, producing misleading 
willingness-to-pay estimates for a whole range of choice characteristics. This issue arises in the 
context of any differentiated products demand estimation and we describe the construction of an 
instrument for price in the Technical Appendix.  
  A second identification issue of particular concern for our application relates to the 
correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics in Z  (which includes 
neighborhood race, income and education, as well as school quality) with unobserved housing 
and neighborhood quality, ξh - a correlation that arises given the sorting of households across 
locations. To properly estimate preferences in the face of this endogeneity problem, we adapt a 
technique previously developed by Black (1999) when estimating preferences for school quality. 
Black’s strategy makes use of a sample of houses near school attendance zone boundaries, 
                                                      
30 Notice that the set of observed residential choices provides no information that distinguishes the 
components of δ.  That is, however δ is broken into components, the effect on the probabilities shown in 
equation (10) is identical.   19 
 
estimating a hedonic price regression that includes boundary fixed effects. Intuitively, the idea is 
to compare houses in the same local neighborhood but on opposite sides of the boundary, 
exploiting the discontinuity in the right to attend a given school. For our purposes, boundary fixed 
effects are likely to absorb out differences in many fixed housing and neighborhood attributes, 
including ones that are unobservable.
31 To the extent that sorting with respect to the school 
district boundaries that we use is driven by differences in school quality and neighborhood 
sociodemographics themselves, the use of boundary fixed effects isolates variation in 
neighborhood sociodemographics that is uncorrelated with variation in unobserved housing and 
neighborhood quality. Thus, it provides an appealing way to account for the correlation of 
neighborhood sociodemographics with unobservable neighborhood quality in addition to the 
correlation of school quality with unobservable neighborhood quality as well as. 
  Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for various sub-samples related to the boundaries as 
well as the full sample. The first two columns report means and standard deviations for the full 
sample while the third column reports means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a 
school district boundary.
32 Comparing the first column to the third column of the table, it is 
immediately obvious that the houses near school district boundaries are not fully representative of 
those in the Bay Area as a whole. To address this problem, we create sample weights for the 
houses near the boundary.
33 Column 7 of Table 3 shows the resulting weighted means, showing 
that using these weights makes the sample near the boundary much more representative of the full 
sample, column 7 typically being much closer to column 1 than column 3 is. 
  Comparing differences across school district boundaries, displayed in columns 4 and 5, the 
average characteristics of houses with 0.25 miles of the boundary on the high school quality 
versus low school quality side of each boundary reveals that houses on the high side cost $53 
                                                      
31  A number of empirical issues arise in incorporating boundary fixed effects into our analysis.   
Concerning the choice of jurisdiction for which the boundaries are defined, we use boundaries between 
school districts in the Bay Area. A central feature of local governance in California helps to eliminate some 
of the problems that naturally arise with the use of school district boundaries, as Proposition 13 ensures that 
the vast majority of school districts within California are subject to a uniform effective property tax rate of 
one percent.  Concerning the width of the boundaries, we experimented with a variety of distances and 
report the results for 0.25 miles, as these were more precise due to the larger sample size. 
32 In addition, the fourth and fifth columns report means on the high versus low average test score side of 
the school district boundary; the sixth column reports t-tests for difference in means of fourth and fifth 
columns; and the seventh column reports weighted means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a 
school district boundary - the weight is described below. 
33  The following procedure is used: we first regress a dummy variable indicating whether a house is in a 
boundary region on the vector of housing and neighborhood attributes using a logistic regression.  Fitted 
values from this regression provide an estimate of the likelihood that a house is in the boundary region 
given its attributes.  We use the inverse of this fitted value as a sample weight in subsequent regression 
analysis conducted on the sample of houses near the boundary.   20 
 
more per month and are assigned to schools with a 43-point average test score increase.
34 Houses 
on the high quality side of the boundary are more likely to be inhabited by white households and 
households with more education and income – this pattern is evident when looking at the 
difference in means test. These types of across-boundary differences in sociodemographic 
composition are what one would expect if households sort on the basis of preferences for school 
quality, thereby leading those with stronger tastes or increased ability to pay for school quality to 
choose the higher school quality side of the boundary. In the results that we present below, the 
inclusion of boundary fixed effects has the expected effect, reducing the estimated willingness of 
households to pay for average neighborhood educational attainment and income. 
 
Racial Preferences and Discrimination. The strategy of using boundary fixed effects is 
designed to deal with the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics with any 
unobserved component of neighborhood quality valued the same by households of all races. It is 
important to point out, however, that this strategy does not help  US distinguish the extent to 
which these estimated racial interactions result from (i) discrimination in the housing market 
(e.g., centralized discrimination against recent immigrants from China), (ii) direct preferences for 
the race of one’s neighbors (e.g., preferences on the part of a recent immigrant from China to live 
with other Chinese immigrants), and (iii) preferences for race-specific portions of unobserved 
neighborhood quality (e.g., preferences for Chinese groceries which are located in neighborhoods 
with a high fraction of Chinese residents). That is, these underlying explanations are 
indistinguishable from one another because they give rise to predicted residential location 
decisions that are observationally equivalent in the data.    
  To see this more formally, consider a model of housing market discrimination in which 
discrimination drives an wedge between the effective price that blacks versus whites pay for 
housing in neighborhoods with an high fraction of white households. Such a price wedge might 
capture increased search costs associated with finding a house in the face of discrimination in real 
estate brokerage, increased borrowing costs associated with finding a mortgage in the face of 
discrimination in the mortgage lending market, or the increased sales price required to convince a 
white owner to sell to a prospective black buyer in the face of discrimination by individual home 
sellers. Because increases in the effective price that blacks face to purchase houses in white 
neighborhoods are unobserved in the data, their effect on behavior (presumably causing blacks to 
be less likely to purchase homes in white neighborhoods) will be interpreted by our model as 
                                                      
34 As described in the Data Appendix, we construct a single price vector for all houses, whether rented or 
owned.     21 
 
stronger preferences among blacks to reside with black versus white neighbors. In this way, 
discrimination of any of these kinds gives rise to behavioral predictions that can be matched 
identically by a model that only allows for preferences over racial composition. 
  Our inability to distinguish preferences from discrimination implies that the primary 
counterfactual simulation that we consider below – where we set the estimated ‘preference’ 
parameters associated with neighborhood race to zero – essentially sets all factors that affect 
racial sorting, whether as a result of preferences or discrimination, to zero. In this way, while 
distinguishing preferences from discrimination is important for interpreting the welfare 
implications of our results, our inability to distinguish these potential explanations for racial 
sorting does not seriously affect the key aim of our analysis, which is to gauge the impact of 
racial sorting as a whole in driving racial differences in the consumption of neighborhood 
amenities.  
 
7 PARAMETER  ESTIMATES 
  Estimation of the full model proceeds in two stages, as noted, the first stage recovering 
interaction parameters and vector of mean indirect utilities, the second stage returning the 
components of mean indirect utility. We report the estimates of the interaction parameters in 
Appendix Table 2. As the table demonstrates, the first stage of the estimation procedure returns 
165 parameters on terms that interact individual and household characteristics, permitting great 
flexibility in preferences across different types of households.
 35 In particular, the model includes 
the following household characteristics: total household income, household income from capital 
sources (a proxy for wealth), race, education, work status, age, the presence of children, and, 
importantly, interactions of household income and race. These household characteristics are 
interacted with many housing and neighborhood attributes including house price, owner-
occupancy status,
36 number of rooms, the age of the structure, average test score, elevation, 
population density, crime and eight variables characterizing the neighborhood sociodemographic 
composition: the fraction of households of each race, the fraction of households college educated, 
average neighborhood income, and neighborhood income interacted with race. The model also 
                                                      
35 An extended discussion of this broad set of parameter estimates can be found in Bayer, McMillan, and 
Rueben (2004b), which formally sets out the model and estimation procedure used here.  In this paper, we 
focus primarily on the parameters associated with race. 
36 We treat ownership status as a fixed feature of a housing unit in the analysis.  Thus, whether a household 
rents or owns is endogenously determined within the model by its house choice.  In the model, we allow 
households to have heterogeneous preferences for home-ownership (a positive interaction between 
household wealth and ownership, for example, will imply that wealthier households are more likely to own 
their housing unit, as we find below).  A single price index is used for owner- and renter-occupied units - 
see the Data Appendix for details.   22 
 
captures the spatial aspect of the housing market by allowing households to have preferences over 
commuting distance.
37  
  This specification is especially flexible from the point of view of the main research question 
addressed in the paper, in two key ways. First, it includes a full set of race interactions permitting, 
for example, black households to have different preferences for Asian versus white neighbors. 
Second, it includes interactions of race and income both as household and neighborhood 
characteristics, thereby permitting high-income Asian households, for example, to have different 
preferences than low-income Asian households for neighborhoods and for these preferences to 
depend on whether a neighborhood has high- versus low-income Asian neighbors.  
  The numbers in Appendix Table 2 are not directly interpretable in dollar values and so we 
discuss the results in terms of marginal willingness-to-pay measures (MWTP); the results for the 
mean household are shown in Table 6 and results related to heterogeneity in MWTP are shown in 
Table 7. The first three columns of Table 6 report the implied measures of the mean MWTP for 
housing and neighborhood attributes that result for three specifications of the mean indirect utility 
regressions. These measures are calculated by dividing the coefficient associated with each 
choice characteristic in these regressions by the coefficient on price.  
  Results are reported for the full sample and for a sample of houses within 0.25 miles of 
school district boundaries, with and without including fixed effects. No clear changes emerge 
when the sample is reduced to only those houses near a school district boundary. Comparing the 
coefficients on the neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics with and without the inclusion 
of boundary fixed effects (columns 2 and 3) yields the pattern of results one would expect if the 
boundary fixed effects control for unobserved components neighborhood quality unrelated to the 
sorting of households across the boundary. In particular, controlling for fixed effects increases the 
coefficient on percent black (reported at the mean average neighborhood income) from -$285 to -
$234; on percent Hispanic from -$37 to $104; and on percent Asian from -$70 to $150. Doing so 
also reduces the coefficient on the percent of households with a college degree from $186 to $165 
and the coefficient on average neighborhood income (/$10,000) from $89 to $85 per month.  
Thus boundary fixed effects seem to be effective in controlling for fixed aspects of unobserved 
neighborhood quality that are correlated with neighborhood sociodemographics, and thus provide 
an attractive way of estimating preferences for neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics in 
the presence of this important endogeneity problem.  
                                                      
37 We treat a household’s primary work location as exogenous, calculating the distance from this location to 
the location of the neighborhood in question.  Estimates based on a specification without commuting 
distance are qualitatively similar.   23 
 
Table 7 reports the implied estimates of the heterogeneity in MWTP for selected housing and 
neighborhood characteristics for the specification associated with column (3) in Table 7, which 
includes boundary fixed effects. This is our preferred specification. The first row of Table 8 
repeats the MWTP of the mean household and then reports the MWTP for households with the 
characteristic listed in the row heading, holding all other characteristics at the mean. The table 
reveals strong segregating racial interactions, with households of each race preferring to live near 
others of the same race. Interpreted literally as preferences, black households with income equal 
to the mean ($55,000), for example, are willing to pay $67 per month on average to live in a 
neighborhood with 10 percent more black versus white households. White households with mean 
income, on the other hand, are willing to pay $38 per month on average to live in a neighborhood 
that is 10 percent more white versus black.
38  
Importantly, the equilibrium predictions of the model concerning racial sorting are driven by 
the differences in preferences across households of different races (as discussed above, this is in 
essence what makes it impossible to distinguish preferences from discrimination in observational 
data). At the mean, the difference between what whites and blacks are willing to pay for a 10 
percent increase in the fraction of white versus black neighbors is about $100 per month. Table 8 
also shows similar figures calculated for households at a higher income level (income=$120,000).  
The difference in the WTP on blacks and whites remain near $90 per month even at this much 
higher income level. Thus, strong segregating forces in the housing market are relevant at all 
income levels for all races.
39  
 
8  EQUILIBRIUM COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS 
We now use the estimated parameters to conduct two equilibrium counterfactual simulations 
that shed direct evidence on our main conjecture. The first simulation is designed to characterize 
the housing market equilibrium in a world in which neighborhood racial composition has no 
effect on residential location decisions. In particular, we consider a counterfactual simulation that 
eliminates all racial interactions in the location decision – that is, one that sets all of the utility 
parameters that govern preferences for neighborhood racial characteristics (including interactions 
of neighborhood race and neighborhood income) to zero. As discussed above, this corresponds to 
                                                      
38 While not the focus of our primary analysis, the estimates of Table 8 also reveal strong segregating 
preferences for Hispanic and Asian households; those with mean incomes are willing to pay $98 and $72 
per month respectively to live with others of the same race versus whites. 
39 The strong racial interactions that we estimate are in no way implicitly assumed in writing down the 
model.  As is clear from Table 8, households of every income level prefer to live with higher income 
neighbors.  This makes clear that the model does not in any way force the parameters to yield preferences   24 
 
calculating a new equilibrium in a world in which no one has direct preferences for the race of 
one’s neighbors and there is no racial discrimination in the housing market.
40  
  Having characterized the importance of racial sorting in driving racial differences in the 
consumption of neighborhood amenities in the San Francisco Bay Area, we then conduct a 
second simulation designed to study the importance of the size of the black population in the 
metropolitan area in driving these results. In this second simulation, we leave composition and 
preference parameters the same and simply change overall size of black and white populations. 
As the analysis of available neighborhoods in Atlanta, Chicago, and Washington DC presented in 
Section 2 suggested, a significant number of mixed- and high-SES black neighborhoods are likely 
to form when proportion of blacks in the metropolitan population increases. In turn, with the 
expanded availability of these neighborhoods, racial sorting might not have nearly the same 
negative consequences for the consumption of neighborhood amenities by black households. 
 
Simulation Details.
41 The basic structure of solving for a new equilibrium consists of a loop 
within a loop. The outer loop calculates the sociodemographic composition of each 
neighborhood, given a set of prices and an initial sociodemographic composition of each 
neighborhood. The inner loop calculates the unique set of prices that clears the housing market, 
given an initial sociodemographic composition for each neighborhood. Thus having set the 
parameters associated with neighborhood race to zero, we first calculate a new set of prices that 
clears the market. Using these new prices and the initial sociodemographic composition of each 
neighborhood, we calculate the probability that each household chooses each housing type, and 
aggregating these choices to the neighborhood level, compute the predicted composition of each 
neighborhood. We then replace the initial neighborhood sociodemographic measures with these 
new measures and start the loop again – i.e., calculate a new set of market clearing prices with 
                                                                                                                                                              
for live with others like oneself, as both high- and low-income households are willing to pay substantially 
more for higher income neighbors. 
40 It is important to point out that this simulation does not set the coefficients multiplying the interaction of 
ownership status and household race to zero.  To the extent that discrimination in the mortgage market is 
responsible for the significant negative coefficient on the interaction of black and ownership status, this 
form of discrimination remains in the new counterfactual equilibrium. 
41 As discussed in Section 5, uniqueness is not a generic property of our sorting model due to the presence 
of social interactions in the sorting process.  Because our first simulation removes the central component of 
these interactions, sorting along racial lines, the potential of multiple equilibria in this simulation is less of 
an issue.  For our second simulation, which leaves social interactions in the sorting process unchanged, the 
potential for multiple equilibria certainly exists.  The counterfactual equilibrium reported in the paper is 
calculated by starting from the observed equilibrium and iterating to a new equilibrium following the 
procedure outlined in this sub-section.  While we do not have a proof that this is the only sorting 
equilibrium in this counterfactual environment, we expect that the general pattern of results would obtain in 
any such counterfactual equilibrium – given the increased size of the black population.    25 
 
these updated neighborhood sociodemographic measures. We continue this process until the 
neighborhood sociodemographic measures converge. The set of household location decisions 
corresponding to these new measures along with the vector of market clearing housing prices 
describe the new equilibrium. 
  Because some neighborhood amenities, such as crime rates and school quality, depend in part 
on the sociodemographic composition of the neighborhood, it is natural to expect these 
neighborhood characteristics to adjust as part of the movement to a new sorting equilibrium.
42 
Accounting for the impact of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics on crime rates and 
test scores is a challenging exercise, as selection problems abound. For example, an OLS 
regression of crime rates on neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics almost certainly 
overstates the role of these characteristics in producing crime as it ignores the fact that 
households sort non-randomly across neighborhoods.  
       In the light of these difficulties, we adopt an approach that seeks to provide simple bounds 
for the characteristics of the new equilibrium that results for each of our simulations. For one 
bound, we calculate a new equilibrium without allowing crime rates and average test scores in 
each neighborhood to adjust. For the other bound, we calculate a new equilibrium, adjusting 
crime rates and average test scores in each neighborhood according the adjustments implied by an 
OLS regression of the crime rate and average test score on neighborhood sociodemographic 
composition. The first bound will tend to understate the impact of sociodemographic shifts on the 
implied crime rate and average test score in each neighborhood, while the second bound will tend 
to overstate the impact of these sociodemographic shifts. As the results below indicate, these 
bounds provide a tight range for the predictions from our simulations. 
 
Eliminating ‘Preferences’ for Neighborhood Racial Composition. Table 8 reports the results 
of our simulation, characterizing the way average housing and neighborhood consumption 
measures change for households in various race and race-income categories. In each case, we 
report three measures: a pre-simulation measure as well as post-simulation measures from 
simulations that do and do not adjust school quality and crime as neighborhood 
sociodemographic characteristics change, respectively.  
  The first two columns indicate the racial composition exposure rate measures that arise with 
the elimination of racial interactions. Not surprisingly, the elimination of racial interactions has 
                                                      
42 Such adjustments may arise due to effects that operate through the political system, as in Tiebout (1956), 
or as the result of productive externalities.  The former effects are likely to be limited in our analysis due to 
nature of the provision of public goods in California, which gives local governments almost no control over 
taxes or the level of spending.   26 
 
an enormous effect in reducing segregation. Black exposure to other blacks falls from over 38 
percent to around 14.5 percent, and black exposure to whites jumps from 37.7 percent to around 
64.5 percent. (Recall that around 67 percent of the households in our study area are white and just 
under 9 percent are black.) Similarly, the average exposure of white households to blacks 
increases from just over 4 percent to 7 percent. Thus removing race as a factor in the location 
decision almost completely eliminates segregation except for a small portion that arises because 
black and white households still differ markedly along socioeconomic dimensions including 
education, income, and wealth.  
The elimination of race as a factor in location decisions also has important consequences for 
the consumption of neighborhood amenities by households of each race. The remaining columns 
of Table 8 report a number of such measures including the home-ownership rate, average 
monthly house price, average commuting distance, and the average consumption of house size, 
school quality, crime, neighborhood income and education.
43 The first two main rows of the table 
show the overall impact of eliminating race-based sorting on black-white consumption 
differences. The largest reductions in black-white consumption gaps occur for public school 
quality and crime for which the gap is reduced by 55-65 percent. The overall black-white 
consumption gap for neighborhood income and education also declines substantially, on the order 
of 45-50 percent. Again, the ranges for these estimates reflect the results of two simulations that 
differ in the manner school quality and crime are adjusted with the changing neighborhood 
sociodemographic composition. Importantly, these substantial reductions in racial differences in 
consumption come about simply by eliminating racial interactions in the housing market - that is, 
without changing household income, wealth, education or other household characteristics.  
The remaining four main rows of the table show results separately for the highest and lowest 
income quartile for both races. Focusing on the results for households in the highest income 
quartile, the numbers reveal that black households in the top income quartile experience increased 
consumption of every type of neighborhood and housing amenity, including house size and home 
ownership as a result of eliminating the role of race in the housing market. Moreover, especially 
large reductions in black-white consumption gaps occur for public safety, 70 percent, and school 
quality, 60 percent. Blacks in the lowest income quartile also experience increased consumption 
of each local public good, but actually experience a decline in housing consumption.  
These results indicate that race plays a profound role in shaping the equilibrium matching of 
households to neighborhoods in the urban housing market. As the consumption patterns of Tables   27 
 
5 have already suggested, because blacks make up only about 8 percent of the population of the 
Bay Area, consumption decisions regarding neighborhood race and other neighborhood 
characteristics are not separable; increases in the consumption of local public goods typically 
mean a decline in the fraction of blacks in a neighborhood. This affects the implicit price that 
blacks versus whites pay for local public goods, thereby accentuating racial differences in 
consumption.  
An important aspect of the simulation results presented in Table 8 is that blacks at all income 
levels also spend a considerable amount more on housing in the new equilibrium in which sorting 
for race-related reasons has been eliminated. This suggests that the observed lower levels of 
neighborhood amenity consumption by blacks in the actual Bay Area equilibrium are at least 
partially compensated with lower housing prices. However, given the difficulties in obtaining 
alternatives for many of these amenities (e.g., highly educated neighbors) in the private market, 
racial sorting in the housing market almost certainly works to strengthen the persistence of 
intergenerational racial differences in educational attainment, income, and wealth by accentuating 
differences in the consumption of important neighborhood amenities that contribute to these life 
outcomes through the formation of human capital and social networks.
44    
 
Equalizing the Number of Blacks and Whites. Table 9 reports the results of our second 
simulation, which equalizes the size of the white and black populations in the Bay Area. In so 
doing, we leave the distributions of socioeconomic characteristics for households of each race and 
the estimated ‘preference’ estimates unchanged.  
In interpreting the results of these simulations, two aspects of this analysis are important to 
point out. First, by expanding the number of blacks in the population relative to whites while 
maintaining the socioeconomic distributions for each race, the counterfactual environment is 
characterized by a sizeable decrease in average education, income, and wealth of the population 
as a whole. This implies that the average levels of neighborhood income and education reported 
in Table 9 will necessarily be smaller for the metropolitan area as a whole. Moreover, rather than 
trying to predict the productive impact of these changes on overall average levels of school 
                                                                                                                                                              
43 We also note that the elimination of racial interactions leads to an overall reduction in commuting 
distances for both blacks and whites; without needing to adjust their location decisions for race-related 
reasons, households are able to more easily find suitable locations in other dimensions.   
44 The possibility remains that black households may use the implicit compensation that comes in the form 
of lower house prices to offset the lower levels of public good consumption with increased private 
consumption that improves the human capital formation of their children.   28 
 
quality and crime, we focus attention on only the version of our counterfactual simulations that 
leave school quality and crime in each neighborhood unchanged.
45  
  A second implication of the counterfactual change is that, using the same cut-offs for the 
income quartiles as in the observed equilibrium, the fraction of households in the original upper 
income quartile range now is substantially smaller than 25 percent (conversely, the fraction in the 
lower quartile is now greater than 25 percent) as a result of the overall decline in average 
socioeconomic characteristics in the metropolitan area.   In Table 9, we hold the income quartile 
cut-offs the same as in the original equilibrium; this implies that households in each original 
income quartile  range for each race are better off relative to the average household in the 
metropolitan area than they were in the original equilibrium. Because most housing and 
neighborhood amenities are assumed to be in fixed supply, it should be expected that when 
broken out by these original income quartile ranges, the consumption of most housing and 
neighborhood amenities increases in each quartile. Moreover, aggregating up, an increase in 
average housing and neighborhood amenities (other than average neighborhood income and 
education) should also be expected for both whites and blacks as a whole. While this may seem 
counterintuitive, it comes about because of the changing relative sizes of the two racial groups in 
the population. 
  Turning now to the results themselves, while certainly not identical to the results shown in 
Table 8, the most striking aspect of the results is their similarity to the previous simulation. 
Focusing on the implied racial differences in crime, school quality, average education and 
income, the declines in the white-black gap are roughly the same magnitude – on the order of 50 
percent reduction in the difference – as those reported in Table 8.
46   
The most notable difference in the results shown in Table 8 versus Table 9, relates to racial 
segregation. In Table 8, the reductions in racial differences in housing and neighborhood 
consumption were directly attributable to the elimination of racial sorting, the resulting limited 
segregation giving rise to better neighborhood amenities in other dimensions for blacks relative to 
whites. In Table 9, the increasing number of blacks at all points in the income distribution gives 
rise to increases in own-race exposure. In this case, the reductions in racial differences in the 
consumption of housing and neighborhood amenities are attributed to formation of mixed- and 
high-SES black neighborhoods. The presence of these neighborhoods increases segregation in the 
                                                      
45 As in Table 8, versions of the simulations that allow neighborhood school quality and crime rates to vary 
with changing neighborhood sociodemographic composition led to very similar results. 
46 Again for neighborhood income and education, the magnitudes drop for all individuals because 
counterfactual increases number of lower SES households – the comparison described in the text relates to 
the difference in average consumption between blacks and whites.   29 
 
metropolitan area (measured as the difference between own-race exposure and the proportion in 
population) but also breaks the implicit bundling of neighborhood race and neighborhood 
amenities in other dimensions. As can be seen in Table 9, this allows high-income blacks to 
consume relatively high levels of neighborhood and housing amenities while living in 
neighborhoods with a relatively high fraction of black household on average.  
 
9  ACROSS-METRO EVIDENCE 
  The results of our second simulation show that the adverse effects of racial sorting for blacks 
are closely tied to the fraction of blacks in the metropolitan population. As this fraction increases, 
racial sorting continues to give rise to highly segregated neighborhoods, yet the consumption of 
neighborhood amenities by blacks relative to whites increases significantly.   
  This simulation also demonstrates that the level of racial segregation in a metropolitan area is 
not a sufficient statistic for characterizing the impact of racial sorting on the relative education 
and labor market outcomes of blacks versus whites. In particular, according to some conventional 
measures, segregation increases in our second counterfactual simulation while the relative 
consumption of neighborhood amenities improves dramatically for blacks relative to whites. This 
suggests that the adverse effects of racial sorting (and the resulting segregation) for blacks are 
strongest precisely when there are very few highly-educated blacks in population. 
To explore this possibility directly, we examine a set of alternative specifications of 
regressions appearing in Cutler and Glaeser (1997, CG). Specifically, using the 1990 Census, CG 
run a series of regressions that relate individual education, fertility, and labor market outcomes to 
individual and metropolitan characteristics. Their primary focus is on isolating the effect of living 
in a more segregated metropolitan area on these outcomes for blacks relative to whites. The effect 
is summarized as the coefficient on the interaction of a measure of metropolitan segregation and a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the individual is black. They report results both from OLS 
regressions and IV regressions, where they instrument for segregation with a number of 
alternative variables designed to isolate the causal effect of residential segregation on outcomes. 
  To explore the possibility that segregation is most harmful to blacks relative to whites when 
the fraction of highly educated blacks in the population is small, we augment CG’s main 
specification to include a measure of the fraction of college-educated blacks in the metropolitan 
population in the level. This measure is included in the level, interacted with the black indicator 
variable, interacted with metropolitan segregation, and interacted with metro segregation and the 
black indicator variable. Thus we allow black-white differences (captured by the coefficients on   30 
 
the interactions with whether the individual is black) to vary directly with the fraction of college-
educated blacks in the population and indirectly through the effect of segregation.    
  The upper-panel of Table 10 replicates the OLS coefficient on the interaction between CG’s 
metropolitan dissimilarity measure and whether an individual is black for age groups 20-24 and 
25-30. While not identical, our analysis replicates CG’s very closely. The lower panel of Table 10 
reports a wider set of coefficients with the inclusion of additional interaction terms associated 
with the proportion of college-educated blacks in the population. Our coefficient of interest is on 
the interaction term (black)*(segregation)*(proportion metro area - black and college-educated). 
This coefficient reveals how the adverse effects of segregation for blacks relative to whites 
changes with the increased share of college-educated blacks in the population.  
  As can be seen in the table, the negative consequences of segregation for blacks reported in 
CG’s analysis fall significantly with the fraction of college-educated blacks in the metropolitan 
area. For the high school graduation rates of 20-24 year olds, for example, the adverse effects of 
segregation for blacks are eliminated when the fraction of college-educated blacks in the 
population reaches 3 percent. This fraction is about twice the average fraction of college-educated 
blacks in U.S. metropolitan areas (1.7 percent). More generally, the effects of segregation for 
blacks aged 20-24 relative to whites for the other labor market, education, and fertility outcomes 
falls to zero when the fraction of college-educated blacks in the population reaches 4-6 percent.  
Collectively, these across-metro regressions provide evidence that is complementary to our 
primary analysis. These regressions not only emphasizing the role of small numbers in driving the 
adverse effects of racial sorting for blacks relative to whites in U.S. metropolitan areas, but also 
provide a link between the study of their impact on the consumption of neighborhood amenities 
and a series of educational, labor market, and fertility outcomes.   
 
10  CONCLUSION  
  The fact that race is strongly correlated with socioeconomic characteristics in the U.S. 
population provides an obvious first-order explanation for the fact that blacks live in poorer and 
lower-amenity neighborhoods than whites. In this paper, we conjecture that another explanation 
may be as important. In particular, we have argued that sorting on the basis of race itself 
significantly exacerbates racial differences in the consumption of neighborhood amenities.  
We motivated this conjecture by first providing direct evidence that predominantly black, 
high-SES neighborhoods are in short supply in almost all U.S. metropolitan areas. As a 
consequence, neighborhood race and neighborhood are explicitly linked in the set of residential 
options available to most households: in order to choose high-amenity neighborhoods, households   31 
 
must typically live with a higher fraction of white neighbors. Given any form of segregating 
preferences, this bundling drives a wedge between the implicit price that whites versus blacks 
must pay in order to consume higher levels of a given neighborhood amenity. As households 
respond to these implicit prices, the resulting consumption of neighborhood amenities by blacks 
would be lower than that of otherwise-identical whites.  
Using a flexible equilibrium model of residential sorting estimated with detailed data on the 
location decisions of nearly a quarter of a million households, we conduct two complementary 
simulations designed to provide evidence on our conjecture. In the first, we compare the actual 
state of the world to one in which race is eliminated as a factor in each household’s residential 
location decision. The resulting halving of the racial differences in neighborhood amenity 
consumption (school quality, crime, average neighborhood education and income) implies that 
racial sorting is just as important as the underlying socioeconomic differences between whites 
and blacks in driving differences in the consumption of neighborhood amenities. In the second 
simulation, we equalize (counterfactually) the proportions of blacks and whites in the 
metropolitan area, thereby relieving the existing bundling constraint, while leaving all preference 
parameters at their estimated values. In this case, the observed white-black gaps in the 
consumption of neighborhood amenities decline by nearly the same amount as in our original 
simulation - the adverse effects of racial sorting for blacks in the Bay Area in terms of 
neighborhood amenities would be virtually eliminated were blacks to constitute a larger 
proportion of the metropolitan area’s population. This result is also supported by additional 
evidence based on across-MSA comparisons that implies that the adverse effect of segregation for 
blacks versus whites falls to zero as the fraction of college-educated blacks in the population 
reaches 3 to 6 percent.  
Overall, our empirical results draw attention to an important consequence of racial sorting - 
the significant distortion affecting the neighborhood quality choice – and provide a clear 
explanation as to why this distortion arises in the first place, due to a small numbers problem. The 
substantial reductions in neighborhood quality for blacks that we find are likely to have a 
significant impact on the inter-generational persistence of racial differences in education, income, 
and wealth. Our analysis also informs a much larger body of research that examines the impact of 
segregation on individual outcomes, drawing attention to the fact that segregation measured at 
either the neighborhood or metropolitan level does not provide a sufficient statistic for estimating 
the impact of racial sorting.  
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Figure 2: Neighborhood Choice Sets in Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit and Washington DC-Baltimore. Table 1: Number of Tracts in United States in 2000 by Race and Education
All Tracts 0% 20% 40% 60%
Number 49,021 26,351 11,094 3,005
Fraction of tracts at least 0% black 100.0% 53.8% 22.6% 6.1%
Percent Black 0% 20% 40% 60%
at least 20%
Number 9,149 2,567 641 59
Fraction of tracts at least 20% black 100.0% 28.1% 7.0% 0.6%
at least 40%
Number 5,657 1,164 142 14
Fraction of tracts at least 40% black 100.0% 20.6% 2.5% 0.2%
at least 60%
Number 3,921 623 44 5
Fraction of tracts at least 60% black 100.0% 15.9% 1.1% 0.1%
at least 80%
Number 2,559 271 21 1
Fraction of tracts at least 80% black 100.0% 10.6% 0.8% 0.0%
Percent White 0% 20% 40% 60%
at least 20%
Number 43,179 25,178 11,041 2,999
Fraction of tracts at least 20% black 100.0% 58.3% 25.6% 6.9%
at least 40%
Number 39,602 24,566 10,839 2,967
Fraction of tracts at least 40% black 100.0% 62.0% 27.4% 7.5%
at least 60%
Number 35,154 22,543 10,214 2,870
Fraction of tracts at least 60% black 100.0% 64.1% 29.1% 8.2%
at least 80%
Number 26,910 17,539 8,102 2,339
Fraction of tracts at least 80% black 100.0% 65.2% 30.1% 8.7%
Percent College Degree or More
at least
Note: Tracts considered have a minimum of 800 households (the average tract in the US has almost 
3,000 households)  Table 2: Neighborhood Patterns for College-Educated Households in the United States
Panel A: Neighborhood Patterns for College-Educated Black Households 
Households first ranked by percent black in Census tract within its MSA
Measures reported by household's corresponding quintile within its MSA
Quintile 12345 Total
Percent Black 5.7 14.4 28.3 54.6 78.9 32.0
Percent Highly Educated 38.0 31.6 26.2 18.4 13.8 27.2
Panel B: Neighborhood Patterns for College-Educated White Households 
Households first ranked by percent white in Census tract within its MSA
Measures reported by household's corresponding quintile within its MSA
Quintile 12345 Total
Percent White 55.0 77.9 86.6 90.4 94.5 77.4
Percent Highly Educated 27.0 36.2 40.7 39.3 39.2 35.3
Note: The panels of the table summarize the average distribution of neighborhoods in which college-educated
blacks and whites in US metro areas reside, respectively. To construct the numbers in the upper panel, college-
educated blacks in each metro area are ranked by the fraction of black households in their tract and assigned to
one of five quintiles . Average neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics are then reported for each
quintile, averaging across all metro areas. The lower panel reports analogous figures for college-educated whites,
first ranking by their tract-level exposure to whites within each MSA.  Table 3. Overall Sample and Sub-Sample Near School District Boundaries
Sample full sample
Boundary/Weights actual sample high test score side* low test score side* t-test for weighted sample
Observations 27,958 13,348 14,610 difference in 27,958
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) means (6)
Mean S.D. Mean Mean Mean ((4) versus (5)) Mean
Housing/Neighborhood Characteristics
monthly house price 1,087 755 1,130 1,158 1,105 5.71 1,098
average test score 527 74 536 558 515 50.96 529
1 if unit owned 0.597 0.491 0.629 0.632 0.626 1.04 0.616
number of rooms 5.114 1.992 5.170 5.207 5.134 3.13 5.180
1 if built in 1980s 0.143 0.350 0.108 0.118 0.099 5.09 0.148
1 if built in 1960s or 1970s 0.391 0.488 0.424 0.412 0.437 4.22 0.406
elevation 210 179 193 194 192 1.14 212
population density 0.434 0.497 0.352 0.349 0.355 2.08 0.374
crime index 8.184 10.777 6.100 6.000 6.192 2.36 7.000
% Census block group white 0.681 0.232 0.704 0.712 0.686 9.62 0.676
% Census block group black 0.081 0.159 0.071 0.065 0.076 6.21 0.080
% Census block group Hispanic 0.110 0.114 0.113 0.107 0.119 8.62 0.117
% Census block group Asian 0.122 0.120 0.112 0.110 0.113 2.50 0.121
% block group college degree or more 0.438 0.196 0.457 0.463 0.451 5.14 0.433
average block group income 54,744 26,075 57,039 58,771 55,457 10.23 55,262
Household Characteristics
household income 54,103 50,719 56,663 58,041 55,405 4.20 55,498
1 if children under 18 in household 0.333 0.471 0.324 0.322 0.325 0.54 0.336
1 if black 0.076 0.264 0.066 0.062 0.070 2.69 0.076
1 if Hispanic 0.109 0.312 0.111 0.102 0.119 4.54 0.115
1 if Asian 0.124 0.329 0.112 0.114 0.110 1.06 0.121
1 if white 0.686 0.464 0.706 0.717 0.696 3.86 0.682
1 if college degree or more 0.438 0.497 0.460 0.467 0.454 2.64 0.441
age (years) 47.607 16.619 47.890 48.104 47.699 1.99 47.660
1 if working 0.698 0.459 0.705 0.702 0.709 1.28 0.701
distance to work (miles) 8.843 8.597 8.450 8.412 8.492 0.82 8.490
within 0.25 miles of boundaries
242,100
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean and standard deviation for key variables for the full sample. Column 3 reports means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a school
district boundary. Columns 4 and 5 report means on the high versus low test score side of boundaries. Column 6 provides a t-statistic for a test of whether the means reported in columns
4 and 5 are equal.  Column 7 reports weighted means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a school district boundary.  Weights are constructed so as to make the boundary sample 
more representative of the full sample and are described in the main text. In constructing columns 4 and 5, we assign each house in the full sample to the nearest school district boundary,
noting whether its local school has a higher test score than the school associated with the closest Census block on the other side of the boundary.Table 4: Black-White Segregation Patterns for the San Francisco Bay Area
Panel A: Average Neighborhood Compositions
Race
Income Quartile q1 q2 q3 q4 Total q1 q2 q3 q4 Total
Household Type
All Households 0.034 0.020 0.013 0.008 0.076 0.150 0.167 0.176 0.194 0.686
Black 0.209 0.090 0.055 0.025 0.379 0.113 0.113 0.107 0.090 0.424
White 0.019 0.014 0.009 0.006 0.048 0.158 0.181 0.195 0.228 0.761
Black - Lowest Income Quartile 0.281 0.104 0.059 0.023 0.467 0.115 0.084 0.062 0.040 0.302
Black - Highest Income Quartile 0.098 0.060 0.046 0.035 0.240 0.101 0.121 0.141 0.153 0.516
White - Lowest Income Quartile 0.026 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.058 0.203 0.191 0.170 0.154 0.718
White - Highest Income Quartile 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.026 0.120 0.158 0.202 0.328 0.807
Panel B: Rate of Exposure Relative to Average Household in Bay Area
Race
Income Quartile q1 q2 q3 q4 Total q1 q2 q3 q4 Total
Household Type
Black 6.1 4.5 4.1 3.1 5.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6
White 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Black - Lowest Income Quartile 8.2 5.3 4.4 2.9 6.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.4
Black - Highest Income Quartile 2.9 3.0 3.4 4.4 3.2 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
White - Lowest Income Quartile 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.0
White - Highest Income Quartile 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.2
Black White
Note: Each entry in Panel A shows the average neighborhood exposure of households of the race or race-income category shown in the row heading to the race or race-income
category shown in the column heading. The first entry in the table implies, for example, that for theBay Area population as a whole an average of 3.4 percent of a household's
neighbors are black and in in the lowest income quartile. Each entry in Panel B shows the rate of 'over-exposure' of households of the race or race-income category shown in the
row heading to the race or race-income category shown in the column heading.
Black WhiteTable 5: Housing and Neighborhood Consumption Patterns for Households in Highest Income Quartile
Panel A: Housing and Neighborhood Consumption of Black Households in Highest Income Quartile
Households ranked by % Black in neighborhood - consumption measures summarized by quintile
Quintile 1234 5 Total
Percent Neighborhood - Black 0-4 4-8 8-20 20-54 54-100 24
Average Test Score 559 528 508 459 418 494
Crime Rate 4 6 8 17 22 11
Average Neighborhood Income 71,150 57,450 55,200 47,300 36,650 53,550
Percent Neighborhood - College Degree of more 54 46 43 41 25 42
House Price 1,584 1,320 1,245 1,163 814 1,225
Number of Rooms 6.8 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.3
Home Ownership 80 71 76 77 87 78
Average Income of Black Households in Top Income Quartile 107,750 98,150 95,300 96,350 91,250 97,760
Panel B: Housing and Neighborhood Consumption of White Households in Highest Income Quartile
Households ranked by % White in neighborhood - consumption measures summarized by quintile
Quintile 1234 5 Total
Percent Neighborhood - White 0-71 71-82 82-87 87-92 92-100 81
Average Test Score 518 548 577 594 602 568
Crime Rate 8543 3 4
Average Neighborhood Income 56,250 64,750 76,300 81,150 95,000 74,690
Percent Neighborhood - College Degree of more 45 51 57 62 65 56
House Price 1,301 1,496 1,684 1,786 2,037 1,661
Number of Rooms 6.2 6.5 6.7 6.8 7.0 6.6
Home Ownership 79 82 86 87 91 85
Average Income of White Households in Top Income Quartile 103,250 109,050 117,050 124,850 136,050 118,050
Notes: The two panels of this table report statistics for the neighborhoods in which black and white households in the highest income quartile
reside. In each case, households are first ranked according to the fraction of households of the same race in their neighborhood and the quintiles
of that distribution are shown. In all cases, 'neighborhood' refers to the corresponding Census block group. The first income measure in each
case is the average income of the neighborhood. The second income measure reported corresponds to households of the given race in the highest
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Notes: All neighborhood attributes are measured using the corresponding Census block group.  Specifications shown in the table also include 
controls for interactions between neighborhood racial composition variables and average income as well as land use (% industrial, % residential, % 
commercial, % open space, % other) in 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 mile rings around location and six variables that characterize the housing stock in each of 







-1.02Table 7. Heterogeneity in Marginal Willingness to Pay for Selected Neighborhood and Housing Attributes
+10% Asian +10% Black +10% Hisp +10% College Blk Group Own vs. Rent +1 Room Built in 1980s
vs. White vs. White vs. White Educated Avg Income vs. pre-1960
(at mean) (at mean) (at mean) + $10,000
 
Mean MWTP 10.4 -23.4 15.0 16.5 85.4 148.2 109.3 87.4
(5.9) (3.9) (5.5) (3.9) (2.6) (7.4) (2.0) (10.0)
Race (at mean income=$54,755)
Asian 97.9 -10.5 25.0 10.3 86.9 253.3 78.8 118.3
Black 38.5 66.6 44.1 35.9 65.8 80.3 117.4 96.9
Hispanic 8.7 -9.3 71.1 17.5 91.0 130.7 96.8 73.9
White -8.1 -37.8 1.1 14.8 86.5 139.5 115.8 82.9
Race (at income=$120,000)
Asian 83.2 -31.7 -0.1 18.4 100.2 394.1 120.2 182.1
Black 37.5 28.6 19.0 41.3 79.2 221.4 159.0 160.8
Hispanic 7.7 -30.6 64.4 22.9 107.1 276.4 141.9 140.5
White -9.1 -58.9 -23.9 20.1 98.0 277.2 155.0 144.9
Education
less than college degree 15.6 -26.0 17.4 -9.1 87.5 134.5 107.0 69.8
college degree 3.8 -20.1 11.9 49.4 82.7 165.6 112.2 110.0
Neighborhood Sociodemographics
Notes: All figures are estimates of marginal wilingness to pay for the change shown in the column heading.  Figures are reported in terms of a monthly rent - 
see Data Appendix for a discussion of corresponding price is created for owner-occupied housing units in the sample.  The first row of the table reports the 
mean MWTP measures that correspond to column (3) of Table 5.  The remaining rows report MWTP measures for a household with the characteristics shown 
in the row heading and mean attributes for all other characteristics.  All estimates are based on specification that includes boundary fixed effects and all 
neighborhood variables are measured using the corresponding Census block group.
House CharacteristicsTable 8: Counterfactual - Eliminating 'Preferences' for Neighborhood Racial Composition
Panel A: Overall Results
Percent Percent Home  House Average Crime  House Commute Avg. N'hood % N'hood
Black White Ownership Size Test Score Rate Value Income Colleg Educ.
Black
Pre-Simulation 0.379 0.424 0.40 4.50 458 18.73 740 9.9 37,400 0.31
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.147 0.646 0.35 4.53 502 12.11 868 9.1 44,700 0.38
Post-Simulation - Adjusted 0.146 0.645 0.35 4.53 496 13.01 846 9.0 44,400 0.37
White
Pre-Simulation 0.048 0.761 0.63 5.36 541 6.14 1160 10.3 57,600 0.47
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.071 0.725 0.63 5.31 531 7.75 1126 9.9 55,700 0.45
Post-Simulation - Adjusted 0.071 0.725 0.63 5.31 531 7.71 1127 9.9 55,700 0.45
Panel B: Results by Income Quartile
Percent Percent Home  House Average Crime  House Commute Avg. N'hood % N'hood
Black White Ownership Size Test Score Rate Value Income Colleg Educ.
Black - Lowest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.467 0.302 0.31 4.08 445 21.29 612 9.8 33,100 0.28
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.172 0.610 0.22 3.94 490 14.06 689 8.9 39,900 0.34
Post-Simulation - Adjusted 0.172 0.609 0.22 3.94 482 15.30 661 8.8 39,300 0.32
Black - Highest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.240 0.516 0.72 5.96 502 11.53 1,261 10.0 53,100 0.43
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.108 0.671 0.76 6.27 535 6.98 1,490 10.1 60,300 0.50
Post-Simulation - Adjusted 0.107 0.671 0.76 6.26 533 7.29 1,477 10.0 60,400 0.50
White - Lowest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.058 0.718 0.46 4.36 521 8.42 838 9.9 46,700 0.40
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.068 0.695 0.45 4.31 508 10.78 788 9.5 44,900 0.37
Post-Simulation - Adjusted 0.068 0.696 0.45 4.30 506 10.95 786 9.5 44,700 0.36
White - Highest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.026 0.807 0.87 6.56 565 4.18 1,607 11.2 71,800 0.56
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.062 0.716 0.87 6.50 559 5.03 1,585 10.7 69,300 0.55
Post-Simulation - Adjusted 0.063 0.716 0.87 6.51 559 4.93 1,586 10.7 69,400 0.55
Note: This table reports the consumption of housing and neighborhood amenitiess by households of each race. Numbers are reported for a counterfactual simulation that sets
all 'preference' parameters associated with neighborhood racial composition to zero.
Neighborhood and Housing Consumption Measures
Neighborhood and Housing Consumption MeasuresTable 9: Counterfactual - Equalizing Proportion of Blacks and Whites in Metropolitan Population
Panel A: Overall Results
Percent Percent Home  House Average Crime  House Commute Avg. N'hood % N'hood
Black White Ownership Size Test Score Rate Value Income Colleg Educ.
Black
Pre-Simulation 0.379 0.424 0.40 4.50 458 18.73 740 9.9 37,400 0.31
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.720 0.131 0.45 4.71 499 11.89 925 9.1 31,700 0.30
White
Pre-Simulation 0.048 0.761 0.63 5.36 541 6.14 1160 10.3 57,600 0.47
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.125 0.705 0.65 5.39 537 7.94 1178 10.4 42,900 0.39
Panel B: Results by Income Quartile
Percent Percent Home  House Average Crime  House Commute Avg. N'hood % N'hood
Black White Ownership Size Test Score Rate Value Income Colleg Educ.
Black - Lowest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.467 0.302 0.31 4.08 445 21.29 612 9.8 33,100 0.28
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.763 0.102 0.31 4.21 489 13.56 741 8.6 25,800 0.25
Black - Highest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.240 0.516 0.72 5.96 502 11.53 1,261 10.0 53,100 0.43
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.683 0.194 0.82 6.10 526 7.43 1,428 9.6 48,400 0.43
White - Lowest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.058 0.718 0.46 4.36 521 8.42 838 9.9 46,700 0.40
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.178 0.695 0.40 4.35 522 10.08 842 9.8 30,100 0.29
White - Highest Income Quartile
Pre-Simulation 0.026 0.807 0.87 6.56 565 4.18 1,607 11.2 71,800 0.56
Post-Simulation - Unadjusted 0.089 0.716 0.89 6.42 551 5.79 1,529 11.4 55,000 0.49
Note: This table reports the consumption of housing and neighborhood amenities by households of each race. Numbers are reported for a counterfactual simulation that
equalizes the fraction of white and black households in the population (38.1%), leaving estimated preference parameters and distribution of socioeconomic characteristics for
each race unchanged.
Neighborhood and Housing Consumption Measures
Neighborhood and Housing Consumption MeasuresTable 10. Enhanced Cutler-Glaeser Regressions: The Effect of Metropolitan Segregation on Individual Outcomes
Coefficients on interactions between black and metropolitan segregation (dissimilarity index) and proportion college-educated blacks in metro area reported
Age 20-24 Age 25-30
HS College Any Child HS College Any Child
Graduate Graduate Ln(Earnings) Idle Born Graduate Graduate Ln(Earnings) Idle Born
Cutler-Glaeser Regressions
Black*Metro Dissimilarity -0.269*** -0.094*** -0.788*** 0.340*** 0.189*** -0.201*** -0.064 -0.433*** 0.310*** 0.131***
Index (Segregation) (0.041) (0.032) (0.140) (0.031) (0.032) (0.039) (0.062) (0.094) (0.038) (0.035)
Adding Interactions with (%  Metro Black and College-Educated)
Black*Segregation -0.412*** -0.101*** -1.123*** 0.387*** 0.218*** -0.241*** -0.016 -0.505*** 0.394*** 0.217***
(0.080) (0.039) (0.260) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.065) (0.164) (0.083) (0.046)
Black* Segregation* (% Metro 13.60*** 2.40 20.06* -5.26* -4.61 6.21* -0.88 6.07 -7.45** -9.83***
 Black and College Educated) (4.32) (3.30) (12.25) (3.09) (3.79) (3.67) (5.94) (7.93) (3.06) (2.87)
Black* (% Metro -8.89*** -2.13 -9.36 4.00* 1.90 -3.02 0.54 -0.82 4.51** 6.00***
 Black and College Educated) (2.95) (2.36) (8.81) (2.49) (2.75) (2.59) (4.22) (5.32) (2.03) (2.11)
Notes: This table reports the results of a series of OLS regressions based on the specifications in Table IV of Cutler and Glaeser (1997). Each specification includes individual characteristics
[Black, Asian, Other nonwhite, Hispanic, Female], metropolitan characteristics [segregation, ln(population), % black, ln(median hhld income), manufacturing share] and interactions of these
metropolitan characteristics with whether the individual is black. The upper panel replicates their results, reporting the coefficient on the interaction between whether the individual is black and
metropolitan segregation. The lower panel reports the results of regressions that add interactions with the proportion of the metropolitan population that is college-educated and black. This
measure is included directly and interacted with the level of segregation in the metro area. Both of these variables are in turn interacted with whether the individual is black. Coefficients are
reported for only interactions with whether the individual is black. All regressions use the metropolitan variables used by Cutler and Glaeser, which Jacob Vigdor has graciously made available
on his website. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.      Appendix Table 1: Housing and Neighborhood Consumption Patterns for Households in Lowest Income Quartile
Panel A: Housing and Neighborhood Consumption of Black Households in Lowest Income Quartile
Households ranked by % Black in neighborhood - consumption measures summarized by quintile
Quintile 12345 Total
Percent Neighborhood - Black 0-14 14-37 37-65 65-82 82-100 47
Average Test Score 502 462 440 417 398 444
Crime Rate 13 20 23 25 29 22
Average Neighborhood Income 42,350 33,950 29,550 26,200 23,100 31,030
Percent Neighborhood - College Degree of more 39 34 24 18 12 25
House Price 695 563 501 473 439 534
Number of Rooms 44444 3 . 9
Home Ownership 20 20 25 33 32 26
Average Income of Black Households in Bottom Income Quartile 12,550 11,750 11,600 11,000 10,400 11,460
Panel B: Housing and Neighborhood Consumption of White Households in Lowest Income Quartile
Households ranked by % White in neighborhood - consumption measures summarized by quintile
Quintile 12345 Total
Percent Neighborhood - White 0-57 57-71 71-80 80-88 88-100 72
Average Test Score 473 501 518 541 574 521
Crime Rate 18 11 7 4 3 9
Average Neighborhood Income 35,100 40,600 46,050 51,200 63,100 47,210
Percent Neighborhood - College Degree of more 29 39 42 44 52 41
House Price 629 694 789 861 1,011 796
Number of Rooms 44445 4 . 2
Home Ownership 37 38 42 48 60 45
Average Income of White Households in Bottom Income Quartile 12,650 13,400 13,550 13,700 13,600 13,380
Notes: The two panels of this table report statistics for the neighborhoods in which black and white households in the lowest income quartile reside. In
each case, households are first ranked according to the fraction of households of the same race in their neighborhood and the quintiles of that distribution
are shown. In all cases, 'neighborhood' refers to the corresponding Census block group. The first income measure reported in each case is the average
income of the neighborhood.  The second income measure corresponds to households of the given race in the lowest income quartile.  Appendix Table 2: Interaction Parameter Estimates
Hhld Children Black Hispanic Asian Some College   Working Age Hhld Black* Hispanic* Asian*
Income Under 18 College Degree Capital  Hhld Hhld Hhld
or More Income Income Income Income
Housing/Neighborhood Attribute
Monthly House Price 0.071 0.071 0.087 -0.244 0.208 0.285 0.400 0.197 0.007 0.013 0.030 0.082 0.034
(0.003) (0.023) (0.051) (0.048) (0.056) (0.068) (0.042) (0.062) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.025) (0.013)
Owner-Occupied 0.142 -0.050 -0.427 -0.046 0.851 0.027 0.191 0.303 0.046 0.094
(0.005) (0.025) (0.058) (0.036) (0.058) (0.051) (0.038) (0.065) (0.004) (0.007)
Number of Rooms 0.151 0.522 0.010 -0.521 -1.223 0.085 0.036 0.011 0.007 -0.060
(0.005) (0.027) (0.034) (0.052) (0.071) (0.047) (0.031) (0.043) (0.001) (0.005)
Built in 1980s 0.045 -0.064 0.065 -0.040 0.184 0.192 0.196 0.337 -0.011 0.019
(0.004) (0.021) (0.046) (0.030) (0.045) (0.062) (0.037) (0.068) (0.001) (0.003)
Built in 1960-79 0.013 0.023 0.315 -0.139 0.221 0.163 0.044 0.209 -0.005 0.002
(0.003) (0.018) (0.054) (0.045) (0.057) (0.065) (0.029) (0.060) (0.001) (0.001)
Average Test Score 0.001 0.056 -0.229 -0.077 0.086 0.186 0.206 0.141 0.011 0.056
(0.002) (0.023) (0.056) (0.039) (0.043) (0.066) (0.040) (0.057) (0.002) (0.002)
Elevation 0.019 0.038 -0.097 -0.134 0.006 0.141 0.090 -0.018 0.006 -0.039
(0.002) (0.013) (0.038) (0.044) (0.036) (0.064) (0.036) (0.042) (0.001) (0.006)
Population Density 0.017 -0.216 -0.561 -0.030 0.004 -0.006 0.159 -0.253 -0.006 0.042
(0.004) (0.024) (0.062) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.063) (0.001) (0.005)
Crime Index -0.016 0.010 0.491 0.045 0.017 -0.044 0.235 -0.164 0.014 0.066
(0.003) (0.021) (0.065) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.041) (0.059) (0.002) (0.010)
% Black -0.073 0.114 1.700 0.697 0.680 -0.089 0.145 -0.114 -0.003 -0.110 -0.032
(0.005) (0.023) (0.069) (0.052) (0.060) (0.054) (0.037) (0.056) (0.001) (0.015) (0.019)
% Hispanic -0.063 0.125 0.700 0.891 0.425 -0.192 -0.094 -0.015 -0.010 -0.076 0.126
(0.006) (0.019) (0.063) (0.055) (0.058) (0.062) (0.032) (0.043) (0.002) (0.012) (0.030)
% Asian -0.003 0.088 0.799 0.311 1.708 -0.064 -0.215 -0.056 0.001 -0.079 -0.036
(0.005) (0.024) (0.061) (0.053) (0.063) (0.059) (0.040) (0.047) (0.001) (0.013) (0.021)
% College Degree or More 0.022 -0.200 0.574 0.080 -0.052 0.375 1.681 -0.338 -0.006 0.093
(0.006) (0.025) (0.054) (0.047) (0.043) (0.070) (0.058) (0.065) (0.002) (0.014)
Average Income 0.045 0.048 -0.808 0.245 -0.053 -0.028 -0.313 0.100 0.003 0.020
(0.006) (0.018) (0.057) (0.045) (0.041) (0.049) (0.053) (0.056) (0.001) (0.006)
% Black*Average Income 0.054 0.674 -0.026
(0.009) (0.078) (0.032)
% Hispanic*Average Income 0.067 0.340 -0.081
(0.010) (0.067) (0.039)
% Asian*Average Income 0.010 0.282 -0.003
(0.009) (0.071) (0.027)
Distance to Work -0.022 0.156 -0.272 0.189 0.221 -0.093 0.160 -13.765 -0.010 -0.468
(0.002) (0.023) (0.043) (0.035) (0.039) (0.058) (0.032) (0.056) (0.001) (0.019)
Household Characteristic
Note: Parameter estimates reported with all variables normalized to have mean zero, standard deviation one.  Standard errors are in parentheses.